That’s probably true.
The conditions to run into this issue are probably rare. The user must lock down user/root isolation as well as modify a package managed configuration file in /etc, later get compromised.
That tweet sounds dramatic. It assumes a concept (such as user-sysmaint-split) for meaningful user/root isolation is already a standard feature, which isn’t the case.
By the time an attacker can run this attack, the has user has usually already bigger issues. The following XKCD applies.
That tweet also seems to completely disregard any prior accomplishments an has the mindset “found 1 issue → trash the whole thing”, which isn’t productive.
Since user-sysmaint-split is due to become the default for new images with the next release, this report comes at a good time. That might be the end of upgrade-nonroot for account user for the foreseeable future. Other way solutions in the future, related:
How this can be fixed in a upcomming stable upgrade:
- A)
upgrade-nonrootusingapt-get-noninteractive(might be unexpected); or - B) disable
upgrade-nonroot.