Madaidan's opinion on Linux Security

Hello. I just found and went throught “Madaidan’s Insecurities” blog. I particulary found interesting the article about Linux Security. I honestly haven’t read it entirely. I just read the introduction. I also didn’t fact-checked, but I think I remember that Madaidan was a developper working on Kicksecure and he was the main person working onto security mechanisms. If I am wrong on any point mentioned in this post, I am very sorry, and please correct me.

So, Madaidan states Linux security is very weak and only heavy low-level hardening was partially resolving the issue. He talks about things that I know Kicksecure can’t solve (I speak about writing Linux kernel mainly on memory safe languages). He also talks about things that Kicksecure could solve (I speak about Kernel Hardening, Applications Sandboxing, and the whole Section about Root Compromise and Exploit Mitigations).

I will state that the work of Kicksecure is to do all the low-level complicated hardening that would be a nightmare for the end-users (this is my personnal comprehension). However, in his other article, the Linux Hardening guide, he says this :

There are many factors that go into choosing a good Linux distribution.

  • Avoid distributions that freeze packages. […]

  • Use a distribution with an init system other than systemd. […]

  • Use musl as the default C library. […]

  • Preferably use a distribution that utilises LibreSSL by default rather than OpenSSL. […]

Now, here is what I get when I ask about these points applied to Debian (the base of Kicksecure) to an online recent LLM (in our case, GPT-4o mini):

Package Management Debian’s stable branch involves freeze periods for packages, potentially leading to outdated software. However, security updates are provided for stable releases.
Init System Debian uses systemd as its default init system. This conflicts with the preference for an alternative init system due to the complexity and attack surface you highlighted.
C Library Debian primarily uses glibc. While stable, glibc has a larger attack surface compared to musl. This is a disadvantage from the security perspective you’ve outlined.
SSL Library Debian defaults to OpenSSL, which has the vulnerabilities and issues you’ve mentioned. This doesn’t align with the preference for LibreSSL.

So either Kicksecure solves by himself these Debian’s problems, either it keeps it.

After exposing all of those points, my questions are:

  • Does Kicksecure solves the points that I mentioned? If yes, wich ones, and how?
  • If there are still major gaps (in addition to problems that are inherent to the Linux kernel), how can you still recommend Kicksecure as a hardened operating system (not to blame or offend anyone, I greatly respect your work)?
  • What Madaidan did or plained to do to solve these problems when he was working on Kicksecure? Is there someone to replace him now? Does the Kicksecure hardening level lowered because he left?

(Sorry for my grammar errors. English ins’t my native language. Thanks for reading.)

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