After my previous question about Kicksecure outgoing traffic was answered, I have a further relevant follow-up question.
When trying to compare Kicksecure Host to Qubes Hypervisor with Whonix: Is Qubes more secure and reliable regarding avoiding outgoing clearnet traffic, because Tor is technically enforced for all outgoing traffic via settings, i.e. there’s always Whonix-Gateway (proxy) in between which acts like a kill switch? From my understanding this is not the case in Kicksecure.
B) a Qubes based Whonix-Host (not even planned by anyone); or
C) a Whonix based sys-net for Qubes [1]
[1] C) would still not be as good as A) and B), because it would still not be a main goal of the host operating system. Hence, it would still be possible for users to mess up by wrong configuration (using multiple NetVMs) or bugs. (Important Qubes Anonymity related Networking Issues)
If you read the documentation fully, you will see why it cannot be considered “the right way”.
No.
Implementing a firewall that reliably allows outgoing traffic for Linux user account debian-tor, loads early enough, has no race conditions, a fail-closed error handling mechanism and does not leak is challenging. Users won’t be able to do this.